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Recent Cases
FREEDOM OF RELIGION-ONE CANNOT REFUSE
LIFE-SAVING MEDICAL TREATMENT
ON RELIGIOUS GROUNDS
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston
58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971)
In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston' the New
Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with the task of deciding
whether the State of New Jersey could order life-saving medical
treatment for an adult patient who refused such treatment on
the basis of his religious beliefs. Previous cases had held such
treatment justified for a child whose parents refused to allow
treatment, based on the state's role as parens patriae.2 Other cases
had authorized treatment for adults in extremis, holding the sit-
uation to be analogous to children who are incompetent to con-
sent.3 However, Heston did not present either of these situations
nor did the New Jersey Supreme Court attempt to avoid the issue
by analogizing. The court simply ruled that the religious beliefs
of the patient had to yield to the state's interest in preserving the
life of its citizens.
4
Two earlier cases foreshadowed Heston and made it the next
1. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
2. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); In
Re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970).
3. See, e.g., Application of President and Director of Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Georgetown
College].
4. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 581,
279 A.2d 670, 671 (1971).
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logical step in the development of the law in this area. In State v.
Perricone5 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the appointment
of a guardian to consent to transfusions for a child when his
Jehovah's Witness parents had refused to give consent. The ac-
tion had been brought under a statute allowing such procedures
in the case of child neglect.6 The court relied on the interest of
the state in protecting children from harm, even if doing so vio-
lated the parent's religious beliefs. 7 Two years later, in Raleigh
Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson8 the court
was faced with a more difficult question when the hospital sought
permission to administer transfusions to a pregnant woman in
order to save her life and the life of her unborn child. Citing
Perricone, the court stated that it had no difficulty in deciding
that such treatment was permissible for the child. Since the wel-
fare of the child was "so intertwined" with that of the mother,
the order for transfusions was upheld.9 The court specifically
left unanswered "the more difficult question [of] whether an
adult may be compelled to submit to such medical procedures.
"10
With these cases as a background, the opinion in Heston spe-
cifically referred to the unanswered question in Raleigh Hospital
v. Anderson and answered it in the affirmative. The patient, Miss
Heston, was a 22 year old, unmarried adult with no dependents.
She was injured in an automobile accident and taken to John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hospital where it was determined that she had
a ruptured spleen. It was further determined that she would die
unless operated on very soon and that the operation would re-
quire blood transfusions. Miss Heston and her parents were Je-
hovah's Witnesses and refused to grant permission for the trans-
fusions based on their interpretations of the Bible." It was un-
5. 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied 371 U.S. 890 (1962).
6. N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:2-9 (1937).
7. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
8. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied 337 U.S. 978 (1964) [herein-
after cited as Raleigh Hospital v. Anderson].
9. Id. at 421, 424, 201 A.2d at 538.
10. Id.
11. Members of the Jehovah's Witness faith derive the prohibition ef
blood transfusions from the Biblical admonition not to eat the blood of
creatures. See, Leviticus 17:10 ("I shall certainly set my face against the
soul that is eating blood"); Leviticus 17:14 ("You must not eat the blood
of any sort of flesh, because the soul of every sort of flesh is its blood");
Genesis 9:4 ("Only the flesh with its soul-its blood-you must not eat").
See also, Genesis 9:5 and Acts 15:28-29. For a further discussion of the
clear whether Miss Heston was coherent enough to refuse the
transfusions, but it is clear that her mother refused and signed a
release of liability for the hospital and staff. However, the hos-
pital staff, feeling death was imminent, gave notice to the mother
and then applied to a judge of the Superior Court for the ap-
pointment of a guardian for Miss Heston with directions to con-
sent to the transfusions. The guardian was appointed and the
operation was successfully performed. Miss Heston later moved
to vacate the order.
After holding that public interest prevented the question from
being moot, even though Miss Heston was now recovered,' 2 the
court stated that there was no constitutional right to die even if
required by religious beliefs.1 3 To reach this conclusion the court
cited Reynolds v. United States14 for the proposition that the
first amendment does not prohibit the state's control of religiously
motivated actions but only prohibits the interference with be-
liefs. 15 Then, the court found that the state's interest in the
preservation of the lives of its citizens justified interference with
the religious rights of the patient. The existence of such an in-
terest was reinforced by pointing to the state's attempts to pre-
vent and punish attempted suicide. 16 As additional authority, the
court noted that the professional code of physicians and the mis-
sion of hospitals to save lives justified the ordering of the trans-
fusions. When the patient had thrust herself upon the hospital
for care, the court felt it was "reasonable to resolve the problem
by permitting the hospital and its staff to pursue their func-
tions according to their professional code. 1 7 In conclusion, the
court noted that the only contrary decision on the appellate level
was decided under the "clear and present danger" test 8 and that
the correct test in the area of first amendment freedoms was the
compelling state interest test.' 9
While Heston is perhaps the logical successor to the decisions
in State v. Perricone20 and Raleigh Hospital v. Anderson,21 it is
submitted that the opinion ventures too far into constitutionally
protected areas of religious freedom. The foundation of all cases
holding that the state may interfere with the religious activities
of its citizens is the premise that the first amendment only guar-
Biblical basis for this belief and Jehovah's Witness theology see State v.
Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 471, 181 A.2d 751, 755 (1962).
12. 58 N.J. 576, 578, 279 A.2d 670, 671 (1971).
13. Id. at 581, 279 A.2d at 672.
14. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
15. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164, 166 (1878).
16. 58 N.J. 576, 581, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971).
17. Id. at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
18. See In Re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
19. 58 N.J. 576, 585, 279 A.2d 670, 674 (1971).
20. 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
21. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964).
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antees absolute freedom of belief but does not guarantee absolute
freedom of conduct related to these beliefs. 2 This interpreta-
tion of the first amendment, as the court in Heston pointed out,
comes from Reynolds v. United States.28 In Reynolds a Morman
who felt his religion commanded polygamy was convicted of big-
amy and claimed that his first amendment rights had been vio-
lated. In upholding his conviction the Supreme Court formulated
the now famous interpretation that only beliefs are absolutely pro-
tected.24 This interpretation is actually derived from the Court's
interpretation of a letter Thomas Jefferson sent to the Danbury
Baptist Association, which the Court quoted at length:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which is solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none
other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative pow-
ers of government reach actions only and not opinions-
I contemplate with sovereign reverence [the ratification
of the first amendment] *25
Taking this letter to mean that the government may control re-
ligious actions, and citing Jefferson's role as a leading advocate of
separation of church and state, the Court concluded that his state-
ment "may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of
the scope and effect of the amendment." 26 However, a complete
reading of Reynolds suggests that the decision was influenced to
a great extent by the prevailing hostility toward Mormans and
the Court's general feelings about polygamy.
2
Jefferson's letter aside, it is equally difficult to see how the
words of the first amendment can be interpreted to mean that
only beliefs are absolutely protected. 28 The words "free exercise"
22. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Georgetown
College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In Re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658,
317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970).
23. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Such conduct as characterizing polygamy as "odious" among
Northern and Western nations, citing the punishment of bigamy in ecclesi-
astical courts in England, citing the theory of a Professor Lieber that
polygamy leads to despotic government and is thus contrary to democracy,
and upholding a charge to the jury which characterized polygamy as a
"delusion" and which charged the jurors to stop its spread to "innocent
and pure minded victims" seems to reinforce the conclusion that the Court
had little concern for the religious freedoms of the defendant. Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-68 (1878).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ."
would seem to connote actions as well as thoughts. As one com-
mentator has noted, there is no hint of such a limited interpreta-
tion in the Constitution and normal usage does not equate "ex-
ercise" with "belief.129 To make such an interpretation is to in-
terpret away the first amendment.30  However, Reynold's inter-
pretation of the first amendment is so firmly entrenced that it will
probably remain the law. Furthermore, there are some practical
considerations which commend this interpretation of the first
amendment.A1
Conceding that the first amendment only guarantees absolute
protection of beliefs and allows state interference with the actions
which reflect these beliefs, there still must be a standard by
which to judge the legitimacy of government interference. Orig-
inally it was thought that only a "clear and present danger" to
the state would allow limitation of religious freedoms. 32 Recently,
however, the United States Supreme Court has held that "only
a compelling state interest" may justify limiting first amendment
freedoms. 33 Since the court in Heston recognized this as the test
for judging state interference, it must have felt that the state had
a "compelling state interest" in preserving the life of Miss Heston.
It is submitted that this is the point at which the New Jersey Su-
preme Court ventured too far into the religious freedoms of the
patient. While the facts of the cases cited by the Heston court
as authority may arguably support the finding of a compelling
state interest,3 4 it is submitted that the facts and reasoning in
Heston do not.
Few people would deny the state's interest in the well-being
of children or the state's ability to command an act to protect
them from harm, even if doing so is contrary to the parents reli-
gious beliefs.3 5 Indeed the Supreme Court stated that, "parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not fol-
low they are free . . . to make martyrs of their children before
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion. ... 36
29. Comment, Rendering Unto Ceasar: State Health Regulations and
the Free Exercise of Religion, 26 U. CHi. L. REV. 471, 473 (1959).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
See also, Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 42 IND. L.J. 386, 390, 393 (1967); Note, Unauthorized Rendition
of Lifesaving Medical Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860, 866-67 (1965).
32. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
33. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
34. See Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United
States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965); Raleigh Hospital v.
Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
35. But see How, Religion, Medicine, and Law, 3 CAN. B.J. 365, 385
(1960), suggesting that state interest in children is a Nazi-Spartan
theory.
36. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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Therefore, cases which have authorized medical treatment for
children contrary to the parents' religious beliefs do rely on a le-
gitimate state interest. 7 Likewise, there is probably a state inter-
est in ordering life-saving treatment for an adult in extremis even
if it turns out or is known that he may object. The possibility
always exists that the patient would have consented and no one
should be allowed to guess what decision he would have made.38
A less obvious but probably equally valid state interest can be dem-
onstrated in the case of an adult patient with dependent chil-
dren.3 9 To allow the patient to die in accordance with his religious
beliefs could make the dependent a ward of the state or at least
entitle the surviving parent to government aid. The state prob-
ably has an interest in seeing that the child has the benefit of
growing up with both parents and in minimizing the number of
people on state assistance.
40
Assuming arguendo the validity of the finding of a compelling
state interest in the foregoing cases, the fact remains that Heston
does not fit into any of these categories. Miss Heston was not a
child, she had no dependents, and even though there was evi-
dence that she may have been in extremis, the court did not rely
on this possibility. The court, therefore, had to find some other
state interest on which to base its decision and the interest it
chose was the state's general interest in the sanctity of life. To
show that the state did indeed have such a concern, the court
noted that the Constitution did not deny the state an interest
in life and, further, that the state validly punished attempted
suicide, thus evidencing a concern for the preservation of life.41
In reference to attempted suicide the court felt that "if the state
may interrupt one mode of self-destruction, it may with equal au-
thority interfere with the other. ' 42
Even without pursuing the obvious difference between ac-
tively seeking one's own death and passively submitting to fate, a
37. See, e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); In
Re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970).
38. See Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), however
the fact that the patient's husband had voiced his opposition to the trans-
fusion somewhat weakens the in extremis basis for this decision.
39. See Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United
States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965).
40. But see Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical
Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860, 872 (1965), suggesting that growing up
with only one parent is not enough to warrant the finding of a state in-
terest.
41. 58 N.J. 576, 581, 279 A.2d 670, 672 (1971).
42. Id. at 583, 279 A.2d at 673.
difference which the Heston court and some commentators have
found meaningless, 43 there is an inherent contradiction in using
state control of suicide as the basis for finding a state interest
strong enough to justify interference with first amendment free-
doms. This contradiction is revealed by the realization that the
state's opposition to suicide is itself an outgrowth of Christian re-
ligious doctrine. The Greeks had no law against suicide nor do
contemporary pagan societies have such sanctions. The Roman
law punished suicide by confiscating the deceased's goods, but
only when the suicide was to escape a trial or conviction. The
condemnation of suicide began with the Christian era and Augus-
tine's City of God. By the 6th century the Church had begun
denying burial rites to suicides and this practice was part of the
English Canon Law by 673. 41 The common law prohibition of sui-
cide and attempted suicide developed from this background. 45
Even the writers who support the theory that the state has an in-
terest in the sanctity of life admit that this interest is of Christian
origin.46 If the state's interest in the sanctity of life, and thus its
interest in preventing suicide, is derived from Christian theology,
it is submitted that it is an establishment of religion to hold
that this particular religious belief will justify interference by the
state with another religious belief-the belief that transufsions
are forbidden. To say that the state's interest in life warrants the
administration of blood transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness is to
say that conventional religious belief is worthy of more respect
and protection than Jehovah's Witness doctrine. Admittedly,
Christian morality has an inevitable influence on the law in this
country; however, it should not become a major consideration in
deciding whether certain "unconventional" beliefs are protected
by the first amendment. When commentators argue that state
interference with religious conduct is necessary to protect adults
from their own "folly" 47 and when courts characterize unusual be-
43. Id. See also, Note, Unauthorized Rendition of Lifesaving Medical
Treatment, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 860, 869 (1965); Note, Compulsory Medical
Treatment and the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L.J. 386, 396 (1967).
44. R. Schulman, Suicide and Suicide Prevention: A Legal Analysis,
54 A.B.A.J. 855-57 (1968).
45. Only two states have statutes prohibiting suicide and attempted
suicide. See, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-33-02 (1943); WAsH. REV. ConE
§ 9.80.020 (1951). Four additional states have statutes prohibiting only
attempted suicide. See, NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.495 (1957); N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:170-256 (Supp. 1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 812 (1958); S.D.
CODE § 13.1903 (1939). In the remaining states suicide or attempted sui-
cide is either a common law crime or it is not punished.
46. See, e.g., Larremore, Suicide and the Law, 17 HAIv. L. REV. 331
(1904) (stating that the sentiment against suicide is the greatest accom-
plishment of Christianity);. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the
Free Exercise of Religion, 42 IND. L.J. 386, 400 (1967).
47. Note, Compulsory Medical Treatment and the Free Exercise oj
Religion, 42 IND. L.J 386, 397 (1967).
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liefs are "delusions, ' 48 it is apparent that conventional ideas of right
and wrong strongly effect first amendment rights.
Once conventional morality is discarded as the basis of a state
interest, it becomes apparent that the state does not have a le-
gitimate governmental interest in preserving life. Citizens do not
owe service to the state nor is the work force inadequate; there-
fore, it is difficult to see how the state would suffer from the nat-
ural death of a citizen.4 9 This governmental interest cannot be
supplied by the doctors' professional code. The Heston court felt
that respect for the professional code of the physicians war-
ranted the administration of blood transfusions. 0 However, there
is no mention of professional codes in the Constitution, and logic
would seem to dictate that a code established by an organization
should yield in the face of a constitutional right.
By holding that the state's interest in the sanctity of life is a
"compelling state interest," the Heston court and commentators
who support such findings have emasculated the "compelling state
interest" test in the interest of social uniformity. If "compelling
state interest" is to be a viable test protecting the religious free-
doms of citizens, it cannot be found in every general interest
which the state has. 51 It is not the duty of the citizen to show
that his actions are legitimate, it is the duty of the state to show
that its interference is legitimate. As the United States Supreme
Court has said,
[N]o showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensi-
tive constitutional area, only the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitations.
52
It is difficult to see how Miss Heston's refusal of medical treat-
ment which was offensive to her religious beliefs was a grave
abuse which endangered a paramount interest. The New Jersey
Supreme Court recognized that "compelling state interest" was
the standard by which state limitations on religious freedoms are
judged; however, it is submitted that the Court found such an
interest where none existed.
T. R. BOSSERT
48. See discussion of Reynolds v. United States in note 27, supra.
49. See Sharpe & Hargest, Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling Pa-
tients, 36 FORD. L. REv. 695, 704 (1968).
50. See text accompanying note 17, supra.
51. State v. Yoder et. al., 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
52. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-ALLEN CHARGE
NO LONGER PERMISSIBLE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971).
In 1896 the United States Supreme Court approved a seem-
ingly innocuous supplemental jury charge which has managed to
survive relatively untarnished into the present part of this cen-
tury.1 This charge, 2 most favorably denominated the "Allen"
charge,3 had as its genesis the case of Commonwealth v. Tuey, de-
cided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1851.4
After its inception, the use of the charge became widespread, and
finally, in Allen v. United States,5 the charge received the Su-
preme Court's sanction. In particular, the "Allen" charge stresses
the duty of each juror to make up his own mind as to the guilt or
innocence of a criminal defendant. However, the charge further
stresses the obligation of a dissenting juror to re-evaluate his posi-
tion in deference to the judgment of the majority of the jurors.
In essence, the "Allen" charge tells the dissenting juror to ques-
tion the existence of the reasonable doubt which he entertains as
to the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Despite its long and apparently venerable history, the "Al-
1. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
2. The instructions were quite lengthy and were, in substance, that
in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected;
that although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror,
and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they
should examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper
regard for and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their
duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they
should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's arguments;
that, if much the larger number were for conviction a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no
impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally in-
telligent, with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority is for ac-
quittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not
reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred
in by the majority. Id. at 501.
3. Some other less favorable titles have been given the "Allen"
charge; the "dynamite" charge, Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852,
853 (5th Cir. 1962); the "third degree instruction," Leech v. People, 112
Colo. 120, 146 P.2d 346, 347 (1947); the "shotgun instruction," State v. Nel-
son, 63 N.M. 428, 321 P.2d 202, 204 (1958).
4. 8 Cush. 1 (Mass. 1851).
5. 164 U.S. 492.
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len" charge, and its sundry modifications, has come under increas-
ingly severe attack in recent years.6 The basic premise underly-
ing its recent disfavor is its allegedly deleterious effect on the
right of a criminal defendant to trial by an impartial jury.7 As
evidence of this trend, some state and federal courts have either
abolished the use of "Allen"" or else have called for delicate ap-
plication of the charge itself.9 Recent decisions of the Pennsyl-
vania appellate courts and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit attest to this fact.10  Both courts concluded
that the mere potential for coercion of the jury by the charge
supplied sufficient reason for its abolition. In substance, the good
6. Although the charge itself has been invalidated only in a few
jurisdictions, its continued use is drawing more and more sharp dissents in
the cases in which it is upheld. Evidence of the growing dissatisfaction
with the charge may be found in the following cases: Huffman v. United
States, 297 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion); Andrews v.
United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion); Green v.
United States, 309 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1962); State v. Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145,
210 P.2d 972 (1949) (dissenting opinion); State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161,
342 P.2d 197 (1959); Leech v. People, 112 Colo. 120, 146 P.2d 346 (1947);
State v. Nelson, 63 N.M. 428, 321 P.2d 202 (1958). Perhaps the best rea-
son for the continued use of the "Allen" charge was recognized by the
Third Circuit in abolishing its use in United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d
407, 415 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Panaccione v. United States,
396 U.S. 837 (1969).
7. This premise was succinctly stated by the Third Circuit in United
States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (1969):
Thus is revealed the very treachery of the Allen Charge. It con-
tains no admonition that the majority reexamine its position; it
cautions only the minority to see the error of its ways. It departs
from the sole legitimate purpose of a jury to bring back a verdict
based on the law and the evidence received in open court, and
substitutes therefore a direction that they be influenced by some
sort of Gallup Poll conducted in the deliberation room.
All of this constitutes an unwarranted judicial invasion into
the exclusive province of the jury and adds the blind imprimatur
of the trial court to a matter of which it has absolutely no in-
formation: the results of the preliminary balloting in the jury
room (emphasis supplied).
8. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197 (1959);
State v. Randall, 137 Mont. 534, 353 P.2d 1054 (1960).
9. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (1962) (de-
scribing "the outermost limit of its permissible use"); United States v.
Knaack, 409 F.2d 418, 423 (7th Cir. 1969) (advising district courts in the
circuit to be "sparing and cautious" in using Allen); United States v. Pope,
415 F.2d 685, 691 (8th Cir. 1969) (emphasize "responsibility of each mem-
ber of jury conscientiously to adhere to his own opinion in arriving at a
just verdict"); Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir.
1969) (remind each juror "to give ultimate controlling weight to his own
conscientiously held opinion"); United States v. Wynn, 415 F.2d 135, 137
(10th Cir. 1969) (recommending Allen be used in original instructions);
Commonwealth v. Spencer, 216 Pa. Super. 169, 263 A.2d 923 (1970).
10. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1969), Common-
wealth v. Spencer, 216 Pa. Super. 169, 263 A.2d 923 (1970), aff'd, 442 Pa.
328, 275 A.2d 299 (1971).
to be derived from the use of "Allen" was far outweighed by the
"unwarranted judicial invasion into the exclusive province of the
jury."11  As a result, in both Pennsylvania common pleas courts
and in the district courts of the Third Circuit, the "Allen" charge
will no longer be employed by trial judges who find themselves
faced with a deadlocked or "hung" jury.
In Commonwealth v. Spencer1 2 the "Allen" charge was em-
ployed after the jury had been out for five hours and reported to
the judge that they were hopelessly deadlocked. Initially the
trial judge was hesitant to utilize the charge, so he sent the jury
back to continue deliberating, and in the meantime a conference
on the record was held in his chambers. As a result of the con-
ference the District Attorney for Philadelphia convinced the judge
to give the "Allen" charge "if for no other reason than to test its
continuing validity .... " -1 Consequently, the jury was ordered
back to the courtroom and was administered the "Allen" charge.
Approximately six hours later the jury returned a verdict of guilty
on both counts of the indictment (assault and unlawful entry).
The defendant appealed, contesting that his right to a trial by jury
had been violated by the use of the "Allen" charge.
The appellate courts quickly recognized the delicacy of the
situation confronting them. On one hand there existed the prob-
lem of the administration of criminal justice; more specifically the
expensive and time-consuming results of a hung jury. On the
other hand, there was the crucial need to preserve the sanctity of
the right to trial by jury.14 Both federal and state constitutions
mandate that a criminal defendant be accorded the right to trial
by jury.'5 To assure the unanimity of the jury the state and fed-
eral courts demand that no juror be coerced into voting against
his conscientious convictions. 16 Thus, in Jenkins v. United States
the Supreme Court held that an instruction to a deadlocked jury
that "they had to reach a decision" was coercive. 17 Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Holton"8 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found
a supplemental charge to a deadlocked jury to be coercive where
the judge told the jurors, after twenty-two hours of deliberating:
I'm telling you to stand up like men and women and do
11. United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969).
12. 216 Pa. Super. 169, 263 A.2d 923 (1970), aff'd, 442 Pa. 328, 275
A.2d 299 (1971).
13. Id. at 334, 275 A.2d at 302.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416 (3d Cir.
1969).
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 and amend. VI; PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
Only the states of Oregon and Louisiana allow a criminal defendant to be
convicted by less than a unanimous verdict. United States v. Fioravanti,
412 F.2d 407, 418 n.22 (3d Cir. 1967).
16. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 335, 275 A.2d 299, 303.
17. 380 U.S.. 445, 446 (1965).
18. 432 Pa. 11, 247 A.2d 228 (1968).
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what you should do before your God to whom you will
answer some day whether you answer to this court or
not. You will answer to God some day for the way you
conduct yourselves in this case. The chips will be down
and he will know everything you have done. You won't
withhold one thing from Him.19
Instilled with this inspiration, the jury brought in a guilty ver-
dict twenty minutes later. In a similar case, Commonwealth v.
Wilmer,20 the supreme court reversed a conviction for rape be-
cause the initial and supplemental charges to the jury were clearly
erroneous and highly coercive. In Wilmer the judge emphasized
the obligations of the jury to God and country to do what was right
and bring in a proper verdict.21 Although much more flagrantly
coercive than the "Allen" charge, these illustrations disclose the
judiciary's distaste for unwarranted intrusions into the delicate
areas of constitutional guarantees, specifically into the right of a
defendant to a trial by jury.
In reaction to the challenge to the "Allen" charge, both the
superior and the supreme courts reconsidered the validity and
desirability of the charge in light of modern trends in the crimi-
nal process. Both courts came to the same conclusion, the only
differnce in their decisions being a matter of degree. Both saw
the "Allen" charge as potentially abusive of the sanctity of the
right to trial by an impartial jury.22 The difference in treat-
ment of "Allen" by the two appellate courts may best be delin-
eated by saying that the superior court refined and modernized
"Allen," while the supreme court eliminated "Allen" altogether. 23
Both courts, despite the divergence in their approaches to "Allen,"
were in agreement that the danger of coercion presented by the
charge far outweighed any possible redeeming value in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice.24 Both concluded that the "Al-
len" charge of 1896 vintage would no longer be a viable part of the
criminal procedure of Pennsylvania.
Essentially, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that a
modified "Allen" charge could remain a part of the criminal justice
system. In order to prevent the possible coercion of a juror, the
19. Id. at 18, 247 A.2d at 231.
20. 434 Pa. 397, 254 A.2d 24 (1969).
21. Id. at 399-400, 254 A.2d at 25.
22. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 216 Pa. Super. 169, 173, 263 A.2d 923,
925-26 (1970); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 336, 275 A.2d 299,
304 (1971).
23. See generally, notes 25-43 and accompanying text infra.
24. See note 22 supra.
intermediate court added three modifications to the charge.25 The
first two modifications concern the wording of "Allen" that "the
jurors in the minority should listen with deference to the opinions
of their colleagues in the majority." 2  The superior court did
not take issue with this basic premise; however, two implications
arose from this statement which the court found "impermissi-
ble. ' '27 The first implication which the court found objectionable
was "that the minority should yield to the majority, if the ma-
jority is inclined to convict. '28  To counter this implication it was
recommended that it likewise be impressed upon the jury "that
each juror must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt before he votes to convict. ' 29 The second objec-
tionable implication arising from the wording of "Allen" was
that only the minority jurors should re-evaluate their position, be-
cause they were the only ones who entertained a reasonable doubt
as to guilt.30 To rectify this deficiency the court directed that the
jurors in the majority also be told to "re-examine their positions
if they find that several of their colleagues, equally honest and in-
telligent, persist in their minority views." 31
The third modification required by the court arose out of the
overall impression given by the "Allen" charge itself, rather than
any particular portion of the charge. The impression which the
charge left with the jury was that they had to return to the jury
room and come to a unanimous decision on either guilt or inno-
cence.3 2 This additional, pervasive impression required the court
to alter the charge because
[I] nherent in a defendant's right to a verdict by a unani-
mous jury is his right to a new trial should the jurors
fail to agree. While unanimity is to be desired, if at all
possible the jury should be told that they need not reach
accord, if they cannot do so conscientiously.
3 3
The superior court is not the only court which has addressed itself
to the unaimity requirement. The Third Circuit, in the process
of discontinuing the use of the "Allen" charge, saw a definite place
for the "hung" jury in our criminal justice system. In United
States v. Fioravanti4 the Court of Appeals ruled prospectively
that "Allen" would no longer be used because:
So long as the unanimous verdict is required in criminal
25. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 216 Pa. 169, 173-74, 263 A.2d 923,
925-26 (1970).








34. 412 F.2d 407 (1969).
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
cases, there will always be three possible decisions of the
jury: (1) not guilty of any charge; (2) guilty of one or
more counts of the indictment; and (3) no verdict be-
cause of the lack of unanimity. The possibility of a hung
jury is as much a part of our jury unanimity schema as
are verdicts of guilty or not guilty. And though dictates
of sound judicial administration tend to encourage the
rendition of verdicts rather then suffer the experience
of hung juries, nevertheless, it is a cardinal principal of
the law that a trial judge may not coerce the jury to the
extent of demanding that they return a verdict.
35
In so holding the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found
"Allen" to be a violation of the "cardinal principle" barring coer-
cion of a jury by the trial judge.36 Thus, "Allen" could no longer
be administered to deadlocked juries in the district courts within
the Third Circuit. In the Fifth Circuit an eloquent testimonial
to the place of hung juries in our system of justice was delivered,
unfortunately, by a dissenting judge:
[A]s history reminds us, a succession of juries may legiti-
mately fail to agree until, at long last, the prosecution gives
up. But such juries, perhaps more courageous than any
other, have performed their useful, vital functions in our
system. This is the kind of independence which should
be encouraged. It is in this independence that liberty
is secured.
3 7
It was this vital aspect of the jury trial guarantee which the Penn-
sylvania appellate courts moved to protect in first refining, and
then ultimately rejecting the "Allen" charge.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court launched its discussion of
"Allen" by reiterating that "In the past this Court has held that a
conviction will be reversed if the jury's verdict was effectively
coerced by the trial judge's charge."38 The court concluded, "Hence
the precise issue is whether the Allen charge has such a coercive
effect." 39  The court answered the question in the affirmative.
In so concluding, the court limited the basis for its decision to the
first two considerations dealt with by the superior court. It
found the notions that a minority juror should yield to the ma-
jority and that those with no reasonable doubt, i.e. the majority,
35. Id. at 416.
36. Id.
37. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962)
(dissenting opinion).
38. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 335, 275 A.2d 299, 303
(1971) (citations omitted).
39. Id.
need not re-examine their position although a minority juror or
jurors entertain such reasonable doubt, "contrary to the hallowed
tradition of trial by jury secured by both our federal and state
constitutions."40 As to the unanimous verdict consideration, relied
on so heavily by the superior court and the court of appeals, the
supreme court noted that discussion of the point was "irrelevant in
light of the already noted problem."'
1
To fill the void left by the rejection of "Allen", the supreme
court recommended that trial judges who encounter deadlocked
juries in the future use the recently promulgated ABA Stand-
ards Relating to Jury Trial as guidelines.42 The guidelines are
clearly defense-oriented, and furthermore, they impliedly recognize
the place of the "hung" jury in our criminal justice system.
Ironically, despite such an enlightened and progressive deci-
sion, both Pennsylvania appellate courts made their decisions ap-
ply prospectively only. In Spencer the courts found no improper
influence exerted on the jury by the use of "Allen" when the ver-
dict was handed down seven hours after the charge was given.43
Finding this prospective application totally unpalatable, Justice
Roberts was forced to dissent despite the fact that he endorsed
"without reservation the majority's stated intention to forbid use
of the Allen charge. . .. -44 History showed a custom of both the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court to apply newly created rules of law "at least to the very
40. Id. at 336, 275 A.2d at 304 (citations omitted).
41. Id. The United States Supreme Court has since made this con-
sideration irrelevant in Johnson v. Louisiana, 40 U.S.L.W. 4524 (U.S.
May 22, 1972) and Apodaca v. Oregon, 40 U.S.L.W. 4528 (U.S. May 22,
1972).
42. Those standards provide:
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury (a) Before the jury
retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which
informs the jury: (i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror
must agree thereto; (ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with
one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agree-
ment, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only
after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow
jurors; (iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if
convinced it is erroneous; and (v) that no juror should surrender
his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence
solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere
purpose of returning a verdict. (b) If it appears to the court that
the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury
to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruc-
tion as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or
threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable
length of time or for unreasonable intervals. (c) The jury may
be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears
that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.
ABA Standards Relating to Jury Trial (Approved Draft, 1968).
43. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 337, 275 A.2d 299, 304.
44. 442 Pa. 328, 338, 275 A.2d 299, 305 (dissenting opinion).
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case in which it was announced. '45 Justice Roberts found the ra-
tionale underlying the practice to be aptly summarized by the Il-
linois Supreme Court:
At least two compelling reasons exist for applying the new
rule to the instant case while otherwise limiting its appli-
cation to cases arising in the future. First, if we were to
merely announce the new rule without applying it here,
such announcement would amount to mere dictum. Sec-
ond, and more important, to refuse to apply the new rule
here would deprive appellant of any benefit from his ef-
fort and expense in challenging the old rule which we now
declare erroneous. Thus there would be no incentive to
appeal the upholding of precedent since appellant could
not in any event benefit from a reversal invalidating it.
Molltor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill. 2d.
11, 17, 163 N.W.2d 89, 97 (1959).46
Despite the apparent lack of prejudice in Spencer, it certainly
would not be unreasonable to grant him the fruits of his labors.
Such prospective rulings could very easily stifle all incentive for
criminal defendants to challenge those very rules which incarcer-
ate them. Thus, to rule prospectively in this case may hurt not
only Frank Spencer but it may also hurt the entire criminal jus-
tice system which needs to be constantly challenged in order to
facilitate change and reformation.
In rejecting "Allen" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took
a bold but necessary step forward. When a man's life or liberty
hangs delicately in the balance, the intercession of the trial judge
whose main objective is to secure a unanimous verdict is totally
unwarranted. The prejudicial inclinations of "Allen" are suffi-
cient reason to abolish this form of judicial intermeddling. Thus,
Commonwealth v. Spencer stands for much more than the rejection
of a traditional expedient in the administration of our criminal
law. Rather, Spencer stands for the special regard that has long
been afforded the jury trial in America. Judicial interference
with the function of the jury cannot be tolerated, and "Allen"
represented just that degree of interference which will no longer
be permitted. Undoubtedly, other state and federal forums will
follow Pennsylvania's lead. It is submitted that Allen v. United
States will soon fall by the wayside as an anachronism incom-
patible with modern trends in criminal law.
It is a wonder that Allen has retained its vitality as long as
it has. Perhaps the only adequate answer to Allen's longevity
45. Id. at 339, 275 A.2d at 305 (dissenting opinion).
46. Id.
is found in Fioravanti where the court observed that, "Since its
approval over seventy years ago, the Allen charge has persisted
through the years, not so much an objection of commendation
as it is a product of toleration."47 However, the toleration of the
courts is clearly on the demise. Commonwealth v. Spencer is one
more step in the reform of criminal justice which has its roots in
the decisions of the Warren Court.
ROBERT D. KODAK
47. 412 F.2d 407, 415.
TORT LIABILITY-DOCTRINE OF PARENTAL
IMMUNITY ABOLISHED IN
PENNSYLVANIA
Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971)
In Falco v. Pados' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that "the doctrine of parental immunity has no rational purpose to-
day and henceforth will not be recognized in Pennsylvania. '2 In
so ruling the court allowed an unemancipated minor automobile
passenger to recover the full award of a verdict rendered for her
and her father against her mother who was insured.3 The court
further held, however, that since the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity was recognized by statute in Pennsylvania, the defendant's
husband could not sue his wife in his own behalf.
4
The doctrine of parental immunity, unlike the doctrine of in-
terspousal immunity, was not a part of the English common law.5
The doctrine is an eighty-year old invention of the courts, first
clearly enunciated in Hewlett v. George.6 In that case the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court refused to allow an emancipated daughter to
maintain an action for false imprisonment against her mother's es-
tate. Citing no authority the court ruled that:
The peace of society and of the families composing society,
and a sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose
of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the
minor child a right to appear in court in the assertion of
1. 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
2. Id. at 376, 282 A.2d at 353.
3. In the principle case an unemancipated minor (Kristine Falco) was
injured while a passenger in an automobile operated by her mother
(Edith) when it collided with an automobile operated by Stephen Pados.
Kristine Falco's father, as guardian and in his own right, instituted an ac-
tion against Pados who joined Edith Falco as a co-defendant. A jury trial
resulted in a verdict against both defendants for $28,050.80. Pados' insur-
ance covered $10,000 of his liability but no further recovery was obtainable
from him; he was personally judgment proof. Plaintiffs then proceeded
against Edith Falco's insurance company for the deficiency. The insurance
company claimed that such an action was barred by the doctrine of paren-
tal immunity. The lower court, however, found for the plaintiffs, and the
insurance company, in the name of Edith Falco, appealed. Id. at 374,
282 A.2d at 352.
4. Id. at 384, 282 A.2d at 357.
5. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 356, 150 A. 905, 907 (1932);
Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423, 425 (1951).
6. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 835 (1891).
a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the
hand of the parent.
7
The court made no attempt to reconcile its decision with a long
line of common law cases allowing infants to sue their parents to
enforce property and contract rights.' Notwithstanding the seem-
ing lack of authority and logic for Hewlett v. George, other courts
soon recognized that decision as controlling precedent for similar
holdings." By 1957 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was able
to announce that "[t]he vast majority of courts in the United
States deny any right to an unemancipated child to maintain a tort
action against its parent."'10
Although the doctrine of parental immunity flourished, the
widespread recognition of many exceptions to the rule allowed suits
by children against their parents under specialized circumstances."
As mentioned above, an unemancipated child may sue his parent
for enforcement of his property and contractual rights.12 It is also
firmly established that an emancipated child may sue and be sued
by his parent for negligent wrongs.' 3 A number of jurisdictions
have allowed minors to sue their parents for injuries intentionally
or willfully inflicted;14 other authorities have extended this ex-
ception to cases where the injury is caused by grossly negligent
or reckless conduct.' Prior to the principle decision twelve juris-
dictions had abolished the doctrine of parental immunity alto-
gether in cases of non-willful torts.16
7. Id. at 706, 9 So. at 837.
8. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations,
43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1057 (1930).
9. See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903)
(where the Tennessee Supreme Court denied a minor the right to sue her
father and stepmother for cruel and inhuman conduct); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (where the Washington Supreme Court
reversed a decision which had allowed a daughter to recover from her
father for assault).
10. Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 254, 259, 135 A.2d 65, 69 (1957); See also
79 U. PENN. L. REV. 80, 84; 9 VAND. L. REV. 832, 837; Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d
423, 462 (1951).
11. Although other states quickly took the same position (adopting
the doctrine of parental immunity], the tendency has been to whit-
tle away the rule by statute and by the process of interpretation,
distinction and exception, until what we have left today is a con-
glomerate of paradoxical and irreconcilable judicial decisions.
Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 377, 282 A.2d 351, 354 (1971).
12. F.V. HARPER AND F. JAMES, JR., THE LAw OF TORTS, § 8.11 at 647
(1956).
13. See, e.g., Glover v. Glover, 44 Tenn. App. 712, 319 S.W.2d 238
(1958); Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948); Bulloch v.
Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932).
14. See, e.g., Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn. 71, 332 S.W.2d 166 (1960);
Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); See also Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131,
131 A. 198 (1925).
15. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Cowgill
v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
16. These jurisdictions are as follows: Alaska (Hebel v. Hebel, 435
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The case law in Pennsylvania had been equally inconsistent.
In Minkin v. Minkin17 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania allowed
an eight-year-old child to bring suit against his mother to recover
damages for the death of his father alleged to have resulted from
the mother's negligent operation of an automobile. Relying on
the specific provisions of the Wrongful Death Statute, 8 the court
stated that "the purpose of the legislature was to provide for the
recovery of compensation for loss for which the common law
furnished no redress."'19 It was apparent to the court that the leg-
islature had created a right in the minor by providing no excep-
tions to the rule allowing the unemancipated minor to recover for
the death of his parent; it could not be helped that to allow such
a suit might lead to family disharmony.
20
Also in Pennsylvania, a minor had the right to maintain a tort
action against a person who had the right of indemnity or con-
tribution from that child's parent in the event that the child re-
covered damages.21 In Briggs v. City of Philadelphia22 an un-
emancipated minor was permitted to sue the city for its negligence,
despite the fact that plaintiff's father was a joint tortfeasor and
could in turn be sued by the city for indemnification. The appel-
lant (Philadelphia) contended that to allow this action was to per-
mit a minor to sue his parent indirectly, clearly a contradiction of
the parental immunity doctrine. The court, however, disagreed,
stating:
This action is not brought against the parent, but against
the defendant city. The issuance of the scire facias to
bring in additional defendants did not change the right of
the minor plaintiff; her action preceeded against the origi-
P.2d 8 (1967) ); Arizona (Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282
(1970) ); California (Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
479 P.2d 648 (1971) ); Hawaii (Tamashiro v. DeGama, 450 P.2d 998
(Hawaii, 1969) ); Kentucky (Rigden v. Ridgen, 465 S.W.2d 921 (1970));
Illinois (Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 241 N.E.2d 12 (1968));
New Jersey (France v. A.P.A.Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490
(1970) ); New York (Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 297 N.Y.S.2d
529, 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969); North Dakota (Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364
(N.D. 1961) ); New Hampshire (Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d
588 (1966) ); Minnesota (Silesky v. Relman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631
(1968); Wisconsin (Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963)).
17. 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1601-02 (1969) as amended.
19. Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 51, 7 A.2d 461, 462 (1939).
20. Id. See also Vindmar v. Sigmund, 192 Pa. Super. 355, 162 A.2d 15
(1960); Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinki, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936).
21. Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955); Fuller v. Diehl,
156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1944).
22. 112 Pa. Super. 50, 170 A. 871 (1934).
nal defendant only, exactly as it would have done if the
additional defendants had not been named.
23
Similarly, in Puller v. Puller24 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
allowed a joint tortfeasor to collect one-half contribution from the
other tortfeasor, whose wife and daughter had been the plaintiffs
in the original action. Applying this rule to the principle case, if
the original defendant (Pados) had had sufficient assets, the un-
emancipated plaintiff could have recovered the entire verdict from
Pados who in turn could have sued plaintiff's mother (as a joint
tortfeasor) for contribution. Under the facts as they existed 25
however, the unemancipated child had to sue her mother directly
to make up the deficiency that Mr. Pados could not pay, a suit
barred by the doctrine of parental immunity. "Such a result
is no friend of logic. '26 No longer willing to subscribe to such a
paradox, the court overruled the doctrine completely.
2 7
Falco v. Pados directly overruled the law in Pennsylvania on
parental immunity in tort actions. In Silverstein v. Kastner2s a
mother was not allowed to maintain an action against her une-
mancipated minor son for injuries sustained by the mother in an
accident resulting from the son's alleged negligent operation of the
automobile in which the mother was a passenger. Similarly in
Parks v. Parks2 9 it was held that public policy precluded an une-
mancipated minor from maintaining an action against her mother
for injuries sustained as a result of the mother's alleged negligence
in operating an automobile.30 As in Falco v. Pados, in Parks v.
Parks there was little chance that the decision would encourage
family disharmony, in that the mother's insurance company was the
real defendant party in interest. In a lengthy opinion Mr. Justice
Jones, speaking for a majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
doggedly adhered to precedent. He stated that the parental im-
munity doctrine is sound; it helps to avoid family discord, and
prevents the possibility of collusive action between parent and
child where the defendant is insured."' Mr. Justice Musmanno
23. Id. at 56, 170 A. at 872. See also Vinnacombe et ux. v. Phila-
delphia & Am. S., 297 Pa. 564, 569, 147 A. 826, 828 (1929).
24. 380 Pa. 219, 111 A.2d 175 (1955).
25. See note 2 supra.
26. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 379, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971).
27. The lower court had found for the plaintiffs distinguishing the
case at bar from other suits barred by the doctrine of parental immunity
because the original plaintiff, not the minor plaintiff, had brought the
child's mother into the suit by joining her as a co-defendant. The supreme
court said however, that "the foregoing position is appealing, but its adop-
tion would lead to future pitfalls." Id. at 377, 282 A.2d 351, 357.
28. 342 Pa. 207, 20 A.2d 205 (1941). See also Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa.
Super. 500, 178 A. 165 (1935) (where the court refused to permit an ac-
tion by a mother against her eighteen-year-old son who was driving the au-
tomobile in which she sustained injuries).
29. 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
30. Id. at 297, 135 A.2d at 67.
31. Id. at 296, 135 A.2d at 71.
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severely criticized the majority's adherence to an illogical doctrine
especially where, as in Parks v. Parks, the defendant parent was
insured
2
To say that a family relationship will be served because an
injured child is to receive money to buy medicine, to em-
ploy doctors, to hire nurses, to rent a hospital bed, and to
do everything that science can do to restore vigor to a help-
less frame and light the lantern of a darkened brain-is
to say what is opposed to the demons phenomena, contrary
to common knowledge, repugnant to the law of cause and
effect, and antagonistic to established reality based upon
love, reverence, and loyalty between parent and child. Why
would a mother hate her child because, through payment
of insurance money, her beloved offspring may have a
chance to recover?
33
Mr. Justice Musmanno further stated that in any action between
relatives, friends or acquantainces there is always the chance of
collusion to defraud an insurer but no one would suggest that in
all actions, where there is the threat of collusion, the suit should
be barred. "This is a strange position indeed for an appellate court
to take, namely, that because of the possibility (without any proof
whatsoever for suggesting that possibility), of collusion, the court
house should be closed to victims of motor accidents where the
parental relation.
34
After only fourteen years the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the position taken in Parks v. Parks.3 5 Speaking for
the majority in Falco v. Pados, Mr. Justice Eagen stated that the
reasons which supported the doctrine of parental immunity could
no longer be used to bar the suit by child against parent in a tort
action.3 6 In discussing the "speculative theory of family disrup-
tion" upon which the parental immunity doctrine is based, he
stated that it was the injury itself and not the suit that most dis-
rupted family harmony, a fact well recognized by legal scholars.
37
The court found compelling the criticism of the family disruption
theory expoused in Signs v. Signs.38 There Judge Stewart, speak-
ing for the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
32. Id. at 303-21, 135 A.2d at 74-78 (dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 312, 135 A.2d at 79 (dissenting opinion).
34. Id. at 328, 135 A.2d at 87 (dissenting opinion).
35. 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
36. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
37. Id. at 379, 282 A.2d at 355.
38. 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952). In that case the Ohio Su-
preme Court allowed a negligence action by an unemancipated minor
against his father in the father's business capacity.
It seems absurd to say that it is legal and proper for an
unemancipated child to bring an action against his parent
concerning the child's property rights yet to be utterly
without redress with reference to injury to his person.
It is difficult to understand by what legerdemain of
reason or logic or law such a situation can exist or how it
can be said that domestic harmony would be undisturbed
in one case and be upset in another 9
The theory of family disruption is easily criticized where, as in
the principle case, the defendant-parent is insured. Surely there
is little that encourages family disharmony in allowing an une-
mancipated plaintiff to recover her medical expenses from the par-
ent's indemnitor. It is true that the courts have held the fact that
a particular defendant-parent is protected by insurance against
legal liability clearly does not enable the minor to maintain an ac-
tion that he could not otherwise have maintained.40 There can be
no doubt, however, that insurance coverage has been a factor in
decisions that have criticized the parental immunity doctrine.
41
While the court in Falco does not explicitly state how substantial
a factor the defendant's insurance was, the court's criticism of the
family disruption theory and its awareness of the threat of fraud
and collusion between parent and child, indicate that the insurance
coverage did influence the decision. Despite this probable influ-
ence, the decision to abolish parental immunity was unequivo-
cal,42 indicating that an unemancipated minor may sue his parent
for non-willful injuries regardless of whether the parent is in-
sured or whether the suit will in fact lead to family disharmony.
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The court was not unaware of the possibility of fraud or col-
lusion where there is a family tie between the litigants. It was
stated however that "the interest of the child in freedom from per-
sonal injury caused by the tortious conduct of others was suffi-
39. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (1952).
40. See, e.g., Elias v. Collin, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Rein-
gold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A. 153 (1935); Dunlevy v. Butler
Nat. Bank, 64 Pa. D.&C. 535, 62 York Leg. Rec. 117 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
41. In striking down Wisconsin's doctrine of parental immunity the
Supreme Court of that state considered the high percentage of liability
insurance coverage in negligence cases, especially those arising from auto-
mobile injuries. Although the court was firm in its statement that the ex-
istence of insurance coverage would not in and of itself impose liability,
such coverage was a factor in abolishing the immunity rule. Goller v.
White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963). See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H.
352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 303-21, 135 A.2d 65,
74-78 (Musmanno J. dissenting).
42. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
43. The author's criticism is not meant to suggest that the court
should have fashioned a rule of liability based on insurance coverage. The
author merely questions the fact that the rule announced in Falco does
not give the Pennsylvania courts the flexibility to disallow an action by




cient to outweigh any danger of fraud or collusion."'44 The court
therefore announced a sule that would permit the Pennsylvania
courts to make a case by case determination of whether there had
been fraud or collusion and dispose of the case accordingly.
Juries and trial courts are constantly called upon to
distinguish the frivolous from the substantial and the
fraudulent from the meritorious, sometimes even reaching
erroneous results in the process .... [I]t is much to be
peferred that we depend on the efficiency of the judicial
process to ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent
rather than use a broad broom to sweep away a class of
claims, a number of which are admittedly meritorious.
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It was argued that overruling such a long line of precedent was
a matter for the legislature and not the court. Indeed only four-
teen years earlier in Parks v. Parks48 the same court was not pre-
pared to change the existing law on parental immunity in the ab-
sence of a legislative mandate. The court in Falco acknowledged
the positive salutory effect of the rule of stare decisis. Being
equally aware, however, of its responsibility to reevaluate and
change poorly decided or antiquated judge-made law, it struck
down the long standing doctrine of parental immunity.
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44. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380-81, 282 Pa. 351, 355 (1071). In
Immer v. Risko the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
In a day when automobile accidents are unfortunately becoming
so frequent and the injuries suffered by the passengers often so
severe, it seems unjust to deny the claims of many because of the
potentiality for fraud by the few. Moreover, there is something
wanting in a system of justice which permits strangers, friends,
relatives and emancipated children to recover for injuries suffered
as a result of their driver's negligence but denies this right to the
driver's spouse and minor children who are also passengers in
the same vehicle.
56 N.J. 482, 493, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1971). See also Tamasher v. DeGama,
450 P.2d 998, 1001-02 (Hawaii 1969) (where the court questions the justice
and logic of the collusion rationale as supporting the doctrine of parental
immunity).
45. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 381, 282 A.2d 351, 356 (1971).
46. 390 Pa. 254, 276, 135 A.2d 65, 73 (1957).
47. 444 Pa. 372, 383, 282 A.2d 351, 357 (1971). For other cases in
which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has overruled established prece-
dent without a legislative mandate, see, e.g., Smalich v. Westfall, 440 Pa.
409, 269 A.2d 476 (1970) (refusing to impute the contributory negligence of
a driver of a motor vehicle to an owner passenger); Neiderman v. Brodsky,
436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (abandoning the requirement of con-
temporaneous physical contact to collect damages for injuries caused by
the negligence of another); Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395
(1968) (adopting the modern approach, holding a lessor liable where he
fails to repair rented premises as promised); Flagiello v. Pennsylvania
Hospital, 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965) (imposing tort liability on a
charitable institution); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d
796 (1964) (overruling the Lex Loci Delecti rule).
The defendant's husband, in Falco, was not permitted to gar-
nish his wife's insurance policy in satisfaction of the award he re-
covered on his own behalf.48  This ruling was based on Pennsyl-
vania's interspousal immunity statute4 9 which, according to the
court, barred the husband's recovery from his wife.50 In a sepa-
rate opinion, Mr. Justice Roberts expressed the view that the stat-
ute barred only direct suits between spouses and was not applicable
where, as in the principle case, one spouse instituted the action
against a defendant who then joined the other spouse as co-defend-
ant. In such cases he felt that the obvious lack of spousal con-
flict precipitated by the litigation made the interspousal immunity
statute inapplicable. 51
In abolishing the doctrine of parental immunity the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania wisely eliminated an arbitrary paradox in
the state's tort law. Mr. Justice Pomeroy, in a concurring opinion,
urged too that the doctrine be abrogated, but with one qualifica-
tion; where the alleged negligent conduct by the parent involves
an exercise of parental authority, that parent should be immune
from a suit by the child.52  It was his opinion that there are
aspects of the parent-child relationship to which the "traditional
concepts of negligence should not be applied." 53 While such an ex-
ception is appealing it would retain part of the anomalous situation
that had existed before the principle case. It is therefore submitted
that the majority acted prudently in its unequivocal abolition of
the doctrine of parental immunity.
BRUCE WM. FICKEN
48. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 384, 282 A.2d 351, 357 (1971).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1969) provides:
Hereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly in all
respects, and in any form of action, and with the same effect and
results and consequences, as an unmarried person; but she may
not sue her husband, except in a proceeding for divorce, or in a
proceeding to protect and recover her separate property; nor may
he sue her, except in a proceeding to protect or recover his sep-
arate property; nor may she be arrested or imprisoned for her
torts.
50. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 384, 282 A.2d 351, 357 (1971).
51. Id. at 386-87, 282 A.2d 351, 358-59 (1971) (Roberts J, concurring
and dissenting). See also Ondovchik v. Ondovchik, 411 Pa. 643, 192 A.2d 38
(1963) (where the court held that a verdict in favor of a wife-plaintiff
against the husband, for his negligence, could not be vacated solely because
the plaintiff and defendant were wife and husband where the action had
been commenced twenty months before plaintiff and defendant were mar-
rier; Daly v. Buterbaugh, 416 Pa. 523, 537-46, 207 A.2d 412, 418-22 (1964)
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
52. Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 387, 282 A.2d 351, 358 (1971) (Pome-
roy J., concurring).
53. Id. at 387, 282 A.2d at 357.
